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CHAPTER I
ANTECEDENTS
THE two thinkers who have been brought together
as the subjects of this volume spring out of what
is broadly the same movement of modern thought.
If within it they are in some respects antithetic,
this makes them all the better adapted for
simultaneous treatment. Both, on the intellec
tual side, were adherents of the philosophy called
in general experiential ; and with both alike the
whole effort ofthought was inspired by a social aim.
The difference is that by the younger of the two
the experience regarded as the ground of know
ledge was supposed to be explicable by impressions
on the individual mind; whereas the elder had
transcended individualism in this sense, and
conceived of knowledge as fundamentally a social
product. For Mill, the individual human being
is a component of society known prior to the
composition. For Comte, he cannot be known as
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human except in relation to it, and can only be
thought of apart from it by abstraction.
This change of view is often said to characterise
the advance made by the nineteenth century on
the eighteenth. Because Mill had not appreciated
this advance, it is sometimes said that he ought
to be classed as still belonging in spirit to the
eighteenth century. Comte, in this resembling
Hegel in spite of his very different general
philosophy, was one of those who had most
unquestionably made the new point of view their
own. At first sight therefore he might appear
to have all the advantage over his younger con
temporary. This impression, however, would be
wrong. The whole value of a philosopher s
thought cannot be tested by any single point of
view
; and there were lines on which Mill, though
not so systematic and powerful a thinker all
round, went deeper and achieved more than
Comte.
There is not space to say much of the biography
of either; but the leading facts must be given.
Auguste Comte was born at Montpellier on the
19th January 1798, and died at Paris on the
5th September 1857. John Stuart Mill was born
at Pentonville on the 20th May 1806, and died at
Avignon on the 8th May 1873. Comte s system-
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atic training was in mathematical and physical
science; first at the Lycee of Montpellier and
afterwards at the Bcole Polytechnique in Paris.
In youth he also accumulated extensive know
ledge of history and literature, and an extremely
tenacious memory gave him ever afterwards full
command of his material. Henceforth, however,
he only elaborated and did not add to the store.
His later abstinence from the reading of contem
porary literature and journalism he described as
cerebral hygiene. The greater part of his life
(1816 to 1851) was more or less absorbed by the
private teaching of mathematics and by the
duties of posts as public teacher and examiner.
What he always regarded as his distinctive work
had to be done in the intervals of obligatory
tasks; till at length, having been deprived first
of one post and then of another through the
hostility of scientific specialists whom he had
failed to conciliate either for his philosophy or
for himself personally, he was supported, in
further developing his doctrine, by the subsidies
of disciples and sympathisers. In one respect
Mill s external circumstances were similar. He
too was never a teacher of philosophy, but had
duties extrinsic to the purpose of his life as he
had been led to conceive it from the first. A
3y&tr*-^ v**&zsf T&quot;~ rv**
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severe and elaborate education by his father,
James Mill (1773-1836), in ancient literature, in
mathematics, and especially in logic, was followed
by an official career in the service of the East
India Company, which lasted from 1823 to 1858,
when the government of India was transferred to
the Crown. His education, it may be observed,
was in a manner complementary to that of the
Polytechnic student- Physical science was a study
in which Mill was not directly trained, but in which
he eagerly sought information for himself. For
his actual work this was not the least important
part of his preparation ; as, similarly, Comte s
historical reading was not the least important
part of his.
To Comte the impulse towards the philosophic
work of his life came at once from the thinkers
who, before the French Revolution, had speculated
with conscious regard to the better ordering of
society, and from those who, after the Restoration,
were aiming at social reconstruction either by a
continuance of the revolutionary movement or by
a return to the past. The names he has himself
selected from his nearest precursors are those of
Condorcet and of Joseph de Maistre. From the
j former he took the idea that the total movement
of history is progressive; but, precisely as the
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consequence of this idea, found him in detail of
little value because, with the eighteenth century
generally, he had nothing but condemnation for
the Middle Ages. From the latter he took the
vindication of the mediaeval order and of its culmin
ation in the papacy, but, only, as he says, relatively
to the stage then reached by the European mind.
Condorcet had failed to recognise the relative
justification of the past. De Maistre, in accord
ance with the old theological philosophy, held its
justification to be absolute. A sound philosophy,
emancipated equally from theological and anti-
theological prejudices, and regarding every order
relatively to its own conditions, and not as
absolutely good or bad, will move towards a
synthesis under which the provisional value of
both views alike can be recognised. This synthesis,
to which the most advanced minds are tending,
is declared to be itself pre-eminently relative
;
not merely because it too belongs only to one
stage though the final stage of the human
race, but also for reasons that we shall meet with
later.
Comte s aim was thus to be a reformer of
thought for the sake of action. This was also
Mill s aim, directly impressed by his father, who
preceded him as a thinker and worker for
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cause of political and social reform in England.
A disciple of Jeremy Bentham, James Mill indoc
trinated his son with the principles of utilitarian
ethics and jurisprudence as they were understood
in Bentham s school. To these he added a train
ing in the English psychology of Association as
developed especially by Hartley. The works of
the Scottish school of Common Sense were also
read, but with a view to their correction and
development on Associationist principles. For
the merely verbal explanation of cohesions of
feeling in consciousness by mental faculties/
called Memory or Imagination or Reason, different
for each kind of product, was to be substituted
the explanation of them in common by laws of
grouping or association of ideas, yielding
different results according to the nature of the
elements associated and their degree of com
plication. This doctrine James Mill himself
worked out, in his Analysis of the Phenomena of
the Human Mind (1829), to explain the appear
ance of necessity in mental judgments that
present themselves as axioms. The psychological
origin of this appearance, he tried to show, is
the inseparable association of mental states that
have been constantly conjoined in past experience.
From this theory there resulted, in the view he
6-*^o f ^
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passed on to his son, an almost unlimited power
of education, by modifying the associations formed,
to change men s modes of thinking and feeling.
Associationist psychology was not a part of
Bentham s own doctrine, but was added to it by
his disciple. Again, though great in legislation,
Bentham was found inadequate in pure politics.
For a new starting-point Hobbes was recurred to
;
but, instead of absolute monarchy, representative
democracy was held to be the best form of the
State. This position was laid down in James
Mill s article on Government/ contributed in 1820
to a supplement of the Encyclopaedia Britannica.
Beyond the theories of government and legisla
tion, the social science chiefly studied was
Political Economy. The most recent authorities
here were Ricardo and Malthus. Ricardo was a
personal friend of James Mill, who had first
encouraged him to express his views in writing.
By Malthus s law of population, J. S. Mill s
social theories were afterwards deeply influenced.
He and Comte started in effect equally clear
of theology from boyhood. Comte indeed was
brought up as a Catholic
; but he was thrown at
school (from his tenth year) into the intellectual
atmosphere of post-revolutionary France
; and he
himself relates that at thirteen he had rejected
7T
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all historic religion, including theism. James
Mill brought up his son in the conviction that
concerning the origin of things nothing whatever
can be known. Christianity, he held with the
school of Bentham in general, is not only false
but pernicious, the God of orthodoxy being the
most perfect conception of wickedness which the
human mind can devise. By Bishop Butler he
had been convinced that the attempt to argue
from the natural order to a benevolent Creator
breaks down, since the moral difficulties of the
Christian revelation have their analogy&quot; in the
ordinary course of nature. But, as J. S. Mill
observes, during the period in which he grew up,
opinion in England on religion was more com
pressed than it has been earlier or later. If the
Utilitarians were not to throw away all chance of
influence, they must observe a rule of strict
reticence in public; though as a matter of fact
their real opinions were well understood. Comte
was more fortunately situated in this respect.
Even under the restored monarchy he could
speak as he liked in lectures as in writing ; and
he never left any doubt that he regarded every
form of theology, including the Christian, as
superseded, to use his own expression, for all
minds at the level of their age.
8CHAPTER II
COMTE S FIRST PHASE
FOR a very short time Comte classed himself,
along with others who aimed at continuing the
work of the revolutionists against the reaction,
simply as a political liberal. This youthful stage
is just perceptible in his earliest correspondence;
but it was not long before another side of his
mind responded to the influences of the counter
revolution. As in the case of Hegel, personal
circumstances had little or nothing to do with
this. The conservative element in Hegel s mind
is clearly marked in his first great work, written
before he occupied any official position. So
Comte, making the transition with more pre
cocity from his early revolutionary enthusiasm,
expressed to his friend Valat his sense of the
relative justification of the party that was con
tent if it could preserve order against anarchy.
The revolutionary party, he found, had no con-
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structive plan. The destructive work of the
eighteenth century had now been sufficiently
accomplished. A new synthesis must be thought
out before any further direct action ought to be
undertaken. When this was adequately devel
oped, it would be found to supersede mere
negativism, or revolutionary liberalism and free
thought, as well as the old theology, by a pro
gramme which the conservative party or its
dictators, no longer fearing social dissolution,
would see the wisdom of accepting at the hands
of positive thinkers.
In his quest of constructive ideas Comte
thought at first that he had found what he
desired in the social projects of Henri de Saint-
Simon (1760-1825), with whom he came into
contact in 1818. Saint-Simon is a characteristic
figure of the transition from the eighteenth cen
tury to the nineteenth. A noble of reforming
aspirations, he had with varied success devoted
himself to finance in order to acquire the means
of procuring assistance in elaborating the schemes
evolved in his fertile but theoretically untrained
mind. Comte, with his encyclopaedic training in
the sciences, presented himself as exactly the
assistant he required; and the connection be
tween them lasted for seven years. From Saint-
10-
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Simon Comte undoubtedly first took up some
of the phrases and modes of thought that were
his own starting-points. Among these was, for
example, the antithesis between organic and
critical periods, the Middle Ages being regarded
as organic and the eighteenth century as critical.
The general name given by Saint-Simon to his
conception of the new social order was Indus- I
trialism. Industrial capacity is to hold in
modern life the place that military capacity held .
in the Middle Ages. The practical direction is
now to pass from feudal nobles to industrial
chiefs. In the new organic period there will
be a new spiritual power corresponding to the
mediaeval Church. For the clergy will be sub
stituted men of science, artists, and generally the
theoretical as distinguished from the practical
class. The spiritual power, however, is to be
strictly subsidiary. The aim of society is pro
duction in its industrial sense, and the practical
chiefs are the supreme directors and judges. To
them belongs the selection of the doctrines to
be taught.
Comte for a time called himself a Saint -
Simonian, and worked out the new ideas in
papers of which he did not claim the authorship.
One of these, dated 1820, and entitled Sommaire
XI
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appreciation de 1 ensemble du passe moderne, is
reprinted in the series of opuscules appended
to the last volume of the Systeme de Politique
Positive. Comte himself, in the preface to the
opuscules/ notes two points in this as original
:
first, the separation of the destructive and recon
structive, or negative and positive, movements
that have been the components of the Occi
dental revolution since the eleventh century;
and, secondly, the contrast drawn between France
and England according as the central or the
local power gained the predominance. The
two antithetic movements, he concluded, have
been everywhere simultaneous; but in France
the old temporal power was prepared for final
supersession by a provisional predominance of
the monarchy in alliance with the commons,
while in England the commons allied with the
aristocracy reduced the monarchy to a position
subordinate to the latter. For the rest, this paper
is not otherwise original, being in the main simply
a glorification of the joint triumphs achieved or
to be achieved by the spontaneous progress of
science and industry. Comte had not yet seized
his own problem.
The break between the master and the pupil
came with the next paper, dated 1822, and now
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entitled Plan des travaux scientifiques ne-
cessaires pour reorganiser la societeY In that
year only a few copies were distributed. The
short treatise was not effectively published till
1824. when Saint-Simon repudiated Comte s
distinctive views. It then bore the title Systeme
de Politique Positive/ thus anticipating the title,
as well as the ideas, of the later great Treatise
on Sociology now known by that name. The
point of difference was that, according to Comte, j
the work of the theoretical class must come first 1
and give the direction for the new social order
;
whereas, according to Saint-Simon, industrial
l
-
capacity is in the first line, and all else is to
work for its advantage. Also, Saint-Simon found
that Comte had not developed the sentimental
and religious part of his system. This will not
seem surprising when we know that the name
given to the religious doctrine was Neo-
Christianity. By his successors this was put
forward as the consecration of the socialistic side
of his teaching, which they carried further. For
Saint-Simon, while his practical scheme is I
essentially a kind of benevolent capitalism, has \
a place among the precursors of socialism in so
far as he proposes to abolish the inheritance and
bequest of property, and to substitute a selection
x 6- i Lvtliv^ i/i $u
v^ rJCOMTE AND MILL
of industrial aptitudes by the community or its
chiefs. Here it would be easy to find relations
with Comte s ideal polity; but Saint-Simon is
admittedly incoherent, and his immense projects
were never systematically worked out. Now the
/ last thing of which Comte can be accused is
incoherence. Even the mechanism of his system
is all there to be criticised in detail. It was not
strange, though it was regrettable, that he should
afterwards repudiate any obligation to Saint-
Simon. The connection, he declared at last, had
only fettered the course of his spontaneous
meditations.
The early Politique Positive is certainly an
astonishing work. At the age of twenty-four,
Comte appears already as a master, clearly in
possession of the central ideas of his system.
Here was originally formulated his law of the
three states. Of this his disciple Littre, who
became a dissentient from his later doctrine, and
thus fulfils the condition of impartiality, has
failed to find any trace in Saint-Simon. As a
separate thought it is anticipated in a passage he
has brought to light from Turgot ; but the idea,
as he points out, Avas by Turgot left quite un
developed. In Comte it is undoubtedly inde
pendent, and by him first it was made the basisCOMTE S FIRST PHASE
of sociology conceived as a positive science. The
general idea is that the human mind first
explains the course of nature by theological
fictions, in which objects are imagined to be
moved by a quasi-human will; these are then
reduced to depersonalised abstractions, or meta
physical entities; finally, every attempt is
renounced to go behind the positive or scientific
law of the successions and resemblances of
phenomena. This formula having been arrived
at historically, society itself becomes the subject-
matter of a positive science. For the character-
istic_of^
soflial phenoni p.n a,
, in distinction from all
others, is
__the peculiar ^ kincL . ofL,contiiuiity---that-
unites the historical past_with the presen t and
the futurg^jind the formula_ojbj^is_jJie_lii^^j)L
.
the three statesTnow discovered. Social science,
as it develops, will, like the other sciences
(astronomy, for instance), be made the ground of
prevision. The thinkers who work out this new
science will be able to show that a ^certain type
of social order is in the future inevitable, as the
past stages have been in their time. Its advent
can indeed be retarded by want of insight, but
that is all. Nothing can prevent its final realisa
tion. By showing this, the insight of theorists
may cause many otherwise inevitable revolu-
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tionary disturbances to be avoided on the way.
The final movement, Comte holds, is towards
supersession of a theologico-military by a scientific
industrial order. The intermediate system, in
which metaphysicians and jurists took the lead
as respectively the theoretical and practical
directors, is merely transitional. Men of science,
when science has been systematised and unified
under a positive conception, will form the
spiritual power. The temporal power will be
that of the industrial directors, by industry
f being understood in general the action of man
on nature. This will have taken the place of
conquest, or the effort to reduce other men to
subserviency, which was the characteristic activity
of militarism.
In the next opuscule, entitled Considerations
sur les sciences et les savants (1825), Comte
gives an outline of the classification of the
sciences afterwards set forth by him in detail in
the Philosophic Positive. The paper contains
some further development of his views on the
spiritual power, but these are more explicitly
stated in the Considerations sur le pouvoir
spirituel (1826). Here he definitely declares for
the institution of a scientific or philosophical
clergy, separate from the State, and correspondingCOMTE S FIRST PHASE
to the mediaeval church. This, he maintains now
as later, is the only cure for the temporary
anarchy brought on by the division of labour and
the dispersive specialism that accompany the
generally beneficent march of a progressive
movement. The theological base of the old
organic order as it stood having been irrevoc
ably destroyed by criticism, the problem is to
find for the new order a positive base that shall
be indestructible by criticism because it is
perfectly rational.CHAPTER III
THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY
THE result of Comte s development so far was to
turn him away for several years from schemes of
direct social reconstruction. This he had decided,
as against the Saint-Simonians, was premature,
till a philosophy,
itself scientific, had been
founded on the positive sciences. He had
already in his mind the scheme of such a new
the&quot;orelicaT&quot;construction, an^wjis^^bleJQ-draw-ijp
the plan of a Course of Positive Philosophy in
1826. The fundamental work in which it was
^embodied the GOUTS de Philosophic Positive, in
six volumes occupied in actual publication the
twelve years from 1 830 to 1842. At the end of the
last volume he declared himself at length ready to
set to work on the elaboration of the social doctrine
adumbrated in the early treatises. This he com
pleted in the later Systeme de Politique Positive,
which must be reserved for another chapter.
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By positive phQospphy we are to understand
on ^
but in its whole substance consisting of their
higher generalisations. The structure is thus
homogeneous, but- thAris is no thought of deduc-~
ing alj^scientific laws from some single law or
grinciplfi. Such a deduction is admitted to be
impossible. Each science has methods and laws
peculiar to itself. The abstract sciences form a
hierarchy, beginning with Mathematics, which is
fundamental as method and also as doctrine.
being itself one of the sciences of phenomena.
Beginning with Calculus__(in the most general
sense), it_ proceeds through Geometry to Rational
Mechanics, Next come the sciences of inor-
ganic nature Astronomy, Terrestrial Physics,
and Chemistry. Above these are the sciences of
the organic group Biology
......(ending with- -Gere-
bTaTTlij^sj^Q^)_^JidSo^iol^g^. On these six
abstract sciences depend the concrete and the
applied sciences. Scienj^a^Coj^
really_oiie^_ The laws of its component sciences,
interact, and it grows as a whole. But, while it
is divided only for convenience. the grouping
adojDtedL he contends, is the_jiaturaLone. That
is to say, it has been discovered as something
given, not invented ar^ *-h flT&amp;gt; imposed on the
19
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Jacts. For the series of sciences is determined by
a corresponding series of fjiiStinam ^Vin.h1p.
pT^ftT^n-
mena
T the morejdniplft, gftnp.vnl ami ipj^pp.nHp,n t
preceding_
j;h ft m nrft complicated,
. -^special,__and
(impendent. Social phenomena are at the ex-
treme_at once of deendence. speciality, and.
complexity. To deal with the first point, the
relation may be traced all through. For social
phenomena depend on the nature of the organisms
comprising the society ; the phenomena of organic
life again depend on chemical and physical, and
these on astronomical phenomena ; and the con
ditions of investigating astronomical and physical
^phenomena are furnished by mathematics. This
order of successive terms does not exhibit the
whole dependence. The phenomena of society
are further directly influenced by those investi
gated under the heads of chemistry, physics,
and astronomy. To take the most remote from
man : consider the difference that would be
made to the human lot by some astronomically
very slight change in the solar system. On the
other handj, mathematics, directly applica,ble_to
astronomy^ is somewhat less applicable to physics,.
jirul still less to chemistry; and when organic and




matics_onward, Comte observes, jls,.the, descending




with certainty. The less perfect sciences are no
less~~certam, though they are le^s^^exact^than
those that precede them. Since all phenomena
without exception are capable of being brought
under positive laws or formula, there can be,
&quot;when &quot;EnV~scale~ls&quot;~ complete, AOdiffererice as
regards the positive character of the sciences.




The primary reason by which Comte determines
his hierarchy is the relation of the several
sciences to the . Ua^^of-^thje tJiree states/ to
which we must now return. The sciences, it
appears historically, do ^QL_i^lJ.pggs simultan
eously through the theological, metaphysical, and
positive stages. Taken as wholes( thosejbhat deal
wltlT the simplest and most general phenomena
- ,L
are the first to b^pme^ositive j jJThe historical
order is that of the scale given. ^Th^ sciences of
organic life, in Comte s view, had reached the
positive stage only just before his own time.)
Fo_r_him it remained to complete the hierarchy bv^
makinJ^h^^ciBrrae^ society positive. ^ This he
was able to do by assigning a law of intellectual
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development with which other social phenomena
could be connected, for there is a consensus
among all of them. It is enough for the present
that one law has been determined. We have in
this something quite distinctive of social pheno
mena. There is nothing even in organic
life
quite like the linking of each generation of
mankind to those that preceded
it by the pre
servation and successive modification of the
products of thought. Hence results a unique
method, altogether unlike the introspective
method of the psychologists. Hj^JiisUtfieaU*
he insists, has been determined, not by the
necessarily illusory method of self-observation,
which is impossible because the observed and






sideration ofit^ was an attempt, such as had
Veen maHtTm the phrenology of GaU, to_connect
^different regions of the^brain. _withl.coxre^
spjmdingL_^ental faculties-- It is sufficiently
remarkable tha7Tvvitr&quot;no more satisfactory posi
tion than this to start from, he determined the
22THE POSITIVE PHILOSOPHY
mode of establishing generalisations in sociology
which was adopted by Mill, who had long been
in search of it, and confesses that without the aid
of Comte he might never have arrived at it.
The procedure is this. A law of historical
development having been attained by empirical
*..,,: i.n...i.Aiio~c^-. a**a**li*i-*v*i*M*bi** mwtmw*
generalisation from experience, it is tested by
trying whether it can be deduced from previ
ously known laws of human nature : biological
laws, they are called by Comte
; by Mill, psycho
logical. Qomte,_it must be observed, regards his
law of the three states as also a law of the indi
vidual human mind, in which the Historical stages A
of the general mind are recapitulated. How this
is ascertained, or whether it is a happy illustra- I
tion of the method, we need not discuss. Comte s
historical method itself stands secure. It has
taken its place in Mill s logical doctrine as the
inverse deductive method, in distinction from
the direct deductive method characteristic of
physics. In actual historical work of a generalis
ing kind it may be seen constantly in use, and
by Dr. Tylor it has been further developed as a
method applicable in the special researches of
anthropologists.
Comte himself carried his sociological theoris
ing beyond the limits of recorded history. His
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explanation of the origin of religion ascribes
to primitive man a doctrine of universal anima
tion, called by him fetishism. At the beginning
of the theological stage, men spontaneously
regarded each particular thing exhibiting active
powers as alive. It was thus at first the par
ticular object that was deified. By a pro
cess of abstraction and generalisation, classes
of objects were brought under the imaginary
dominion of a separable deity. The stage of
polytheism was thus reached. Further general
isation led to monotheism, the last phase of
theology. Through all this process metaphysi
cal thought was already at work, reducing by
its dissolvent criticism the potency of theological
explanations. Finally, it has attenuated even
theism to the point where it becomes superfluous.
The God of the Deist is equivalent to the meta
physical abstraction Nature, and becomes merely
a name that is allowed to furnish no element of
detailed explanation, this being left to the grow
ing sciences. When the sciences are mature, the
causes (more than phenomenal) of the theo
logian and the metaphysician are alike dismissed
;
and, as was said, nothing is left but a formulated
law. Not till this mode of thinking has succes
sively extended itself through the series of the
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sciences, and prevailed in Sociology also, can the
human mind be considered as having finally
reached the positive state.
Already in the Philosophic.Positive Comte has
arrived at his conception^ Qt Humanity as_tjig&quot;ff
organic unity within which sociological law is
manifested... This organism consists ofjnen_^as t,
present,_and future ; excluding, however, from
participation its
the other hand, the useful domestic animals are
GSS&amp;lt;5ciai?ed with man in a subsidiary__relation.
guma^^is conceived a fiavmg a beginning
and an end in time, though Comte does not
speculate about origins. It tends as a whole to 9
a final order, which will approachequilibrium but
never actually reach it. After this closer and (f
closer_j^proxiinattion_to__a fixed ideal, there will J,
be an^inevitable decadence as .Jtha. earth, ceases to . ;
be^
fit for human habitation, and the problem for
*
man will then be to adapt himself with dignity//,
to the descent, \yith ^this. however, sociology
.
need not now concern
itselfjjwje_jLrTjtiirm they
movement of ascent, which is of more interest. 1
The progressive movement with which we are /
specially concerned is that which has gone on^C
continuously in the West from the period of




of the positive stage by the most advanced minds
of contemporary Europe. To explain historical
progress, Comte does not recur to theories about
race or climate. These, indeed, are not excluded.
They may, it is allowed, furnish minor explana
tions when the time comes to carry sociology into
detail, but the progress now dealt with is held
to be a necessary evolution of man as man, not
due essentially to the character of some partic
ular race or races. What is at present the most
advanced part of humankind will afterwards
extend its completed type to the whole, all men
as such being capable of assimilating the progress
at first achieved only by favoured societies or
individuals.
With his law of intellectual evolution Comte
seeks to connect a corresponding law of practical
evolution. To the theological stage corresponds
militarism. This first takes the form of aggres
sive warfare and systematic conquest. As
theology passes into its last or monotheistic
phase and becomes attenuated into metaphysics,
defensive is substituted for offensive war. Then,
as positivity grows, militarism is slowly super
seded by industrialism. These, Comte maintains,
are necessary phases of human progress, and




but in the concrete we find the first realised in
different degrees in Asia and Egypt and in clas
sical antiquity, the second in the Middle Age of
Western Europe, and the third in the outlines of
a new positive order now appearing in the most
advanced nations of the West.
By the Greek States, although their history
belongs^generally to the theologico-military phase
of offensive warfare, this is not typically repre
sented. Since no one State could subjugate the
rest, the characteristic movement was checked
on the side of activity, and the distinctive develop
ment of Greece became intellectual. The last
result of this was to reduce polytheism to mono
theism, and to prepare for the Catholic type ;
though Catholicism, in the account it gave of
itself, traced its monotheism exclusively to its
Jewish predecessors. The Romans successfully
carried forward the system of conquest, in which
the Greeks had failed
; and the stage of offensive
war culminated in the Roman Empire. The
problem for this, and for the social groups into
which it broke up, became henceforth defence.
The Middle Ages represent the system of defen
sive warfare combined Avith a reduced form of
theology. In this period, the greatest advance is
the separation of the temporal and the spiritual
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powers, confused both in the theocratic East and
in classical antiquity. This advance was made
only by the Catholic West. Byzantine Christianity
and Islam the rival form of reduced theology
that shared in the division of the Koman world
alike retained the confusion. The Catholic
synthesis reaches its typical form in the twelfth
and thirteenth centuries. Ever since, it has been
breaking up under the joint action of the critical
or revolutionary metaphysics and the growing
positive sciences, now tending, along with the
rising industrial system, to a definitive recon
struction of European life. During the fourteenth
and fifteenth centuries the decomposition was
spontaneous, and was shared in by all the Western
populations. After that it became systematic,
first in Protestantism and then in Deism, and
brought with it first the break of the Reformation
in the sixteenth century, and then the revolu
tionary crisis at the end of the eighteenth. This
crisis can only be terminated when the positive,
as distinguished from the negative, movement
has furnished the elements of a new and final
synthesis.
The practical or temporal power of the
positive age, dawning in the nineteenth century,
will be that of industrial, and no longer of
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military, chiefs. Its supreme spiritual power
will consist of philosophers who have undergone
an encyclopedic training in the positive sciences,
and are able to view them in their systematic
unity. These positive philosophers will be
properly a special class of scientific men set apart
to deal with generalities, since the specialists in
particular branches are clearly incompetent for
the work of co-ordination. The highest social
rank will be conceded to them, but they will
have no material power. Thus they will take
the place of the mediaeval priesthood, which
has furnished the ideal pattern of a theoretical
class standing apart from practical life, but
directing it through the consultative voice it has
in affairs and, above all, by its system of education
applied to all the other social classes and per
meating them from youth with its dominant
conceptions.
&amp;gt;
We can now see how Comte, in his funda
mental work, while moving away for a time from
the social problem he had set himself to resolve,
was preparing the ideas that were to be brought
together in a more concentrated form in the
Politique Positive. Naturally he found it difficult
to .understand on__what ground disciples and
admirers of th!^ Philosophy) couldCOMTE AND MILL
[
\JPolity^ which was to him its necessary sequel.
A partial understanding, however, is possible.
The chapter of thf^Philosophy vindicating the_
ter 0f--4he Gath^olie Middle
some pages in which he sets
forth^ a doctriiLa--xegarding-- -the-separation of
the spiritualfmin---tfee--teTpe^aL^i}OJ^er which
selves able to accept. The direct dominance of a
rtaaa i&amp;gt; thorp
plausible,, since it places intelligence apparently
atJh^siumnit, .but. .as. irt reality the most fatally
jinpiogressive_ of social orders. It renders in
effective the most powerful and original minds
of theoretic type, for which an administrative
hierarchy has no proper place. By the im
mediate connection of the theoretical class with
practice, no room is left for speculative research
undertaken without reference to material needs.
Yet this detachment is of supreme importance
for the progressive character of the practical arts
themselves. Thevtrue form oj^ a spiritual power
isone in which the few eminent theoretical
minds are protected by the State in freely doing
tneif~own worlCISurcto not aim at any place in
a governing corporation.
ihis is, ol course, a very singular prelude to a
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defence of the mediaeval hierarchy, not simply as
an institution adapted to its time, but as a model
for the future. It may be compared with a para
graph in one of the early opuscules, where the
position of the Catholic clergy in the Middle Ages
is declared to be analogous to that of the Greek
philosophers in relation to the State as compared
with the hierarchs of Asia. The presupposition,
however, that European history has been continu
ously progressive, whence it followed that the
Middle Ages must embody a progressive phase,
was not peculiar to Comte. Mill was quite willing
to accept the whole view so far as the past was
concerned
; and, in critical articles, commended
to English readers the work of French historians
by whom what he thought to be Protestant pre
judice was controverted. The difference appeared
when Comte fully recognised his own affinities,
ceased to recur to merely fanciful combinations,
and left no doubt that it was of the essence of his
own spiritual power to be an authoritative cor
poration, which he no longer hesitated to treat
as analogous to an Egyptian or Chaldean
theocracy.
By way of comment it need only be remarked
that Comte certainly did not in the end fulfil the
condition of impartiality he at first laid down forCOMTE AND MILL
himself in rebuking the revolutionary hatred of
the mediaeval past. The antipathy he has ex
pressed again and again for the critical periods
of Greece and modern Europe is quite equal to
that of any Protestant or revolutionary Deist for
the Middle Ages. This apparent necessity to
hate the one type and love the other seems to
^ indicate contrasts hard to deal with on any theory
of continuous progress. And, indeed, it may be
observed that there is a place in Comte s socio
logical doctrine for pathological phenomena and
reversals of progressive movements, though he has
given it little theoretical development.CHAPTER IV
MILL S LOGIC AND METAPHYSICS
IN the preceding chapter I have dealt only with
the generalities of the Philosophic Positive, as set
forth at the beginning, and with the Sociology
contained in the last three volumes. The inter
mediate part of the work contains the systematisa-
tion of the five preparatory sciences, Mathematics,
Astronomy, Physics, Chemistry, and Biology.
Comte himself did not claim the knowledge of a
specialist in any of these except mathematics,
nor did he exaggerate the importance of his pre
liminary work. Perhaps afterwards, when those
who had accepted it almost without qualification
would follow him no further, he came to under
rate it. It had a genuinely emancipating influence,
especially in England, where it soon began to draw
more attention than it had gained in France.
Among the most enthusiastic readers of the
successive volumes was Mill, who in 1841 began a
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correspondence with Comte which continued till
1846. At first Mill announced himself as a
disciple, but he was a disciple who claimed the
right to criticise, and thought to exercise as well
as to receive influence. Later, what seemed to
him the appallingly systematic character of
Comte s mind, for which every principle was
settled and every detail had the certainty of
positive science, showed him that the kind of
interchange he had hoped for was impossible. To
Mill, as to early friends, Comte frankly declared
that he had no use for criticism, except regarding
the legitimacy of deductions. That any one who
remained at the theological or at the metaphysical
stage should not accept the new system was in
telligible ; but for a mind that had reached full
positivity he did not see what attitude was
possible but adhesion. At first, however, the
correspondence was extremely cordial. Comte
read with interest Mill s System of Logic, pub
lished in 1843, making for it an exception from
his rule of not reading contemporary work. He
found in it the most advanced position, next to
his own, occupied by any European thinker
; and
this, he perceived, had been independently
arrived at. It was Mill s generosity, he declared,
that had led him to cite the Philosophic, Positive
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so frequently. The development of his thought
would have been substantially the same with
out it.
This is true, as Mill showed himself aware later.
Still, in the history of inductive logic Comte ranks
as his immediate precursor, his remoter precursors
being Bacon and Hume. His direct studies for
his work had been mainly in actual science and
in contemporary English writers of minor origin
ality. As the essential problem, he fixed at last
on the question
: What constitutes scientific
proof in the experimental investigation of nature ?
It is here that he himself came to see his distinc
tive strength as compared with that of Comte,
who, he found, had never attained a just concep
tion of the conditions of proof as distinguished
from method. The problem of method had of
course been specially raised by Bacon, who gave a
first sketch of the procedure formulated by Mill
in his
* canons of induction as the ground for
applying his test of truth. On the question of
ultimate truth in science, which was Hume s
special problem, Bacon was quite vague. Here
Comte and Mill were equally clear in substance,
and, by more serious occupation with the actual
processes of science, had disentangled the idea of
fixed law or order : which, while it had been put
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forward by Hume, had received from him a
sceptical colour. This, he said, is all that there
seems to be in science; but, if our scholastic
dogmatists are right, there ought to be something
more. That the order was really positive or
certain, Comte was assured by the applicability
of mathematics to the things of nature. For the
power of dealing with them by quantitative
measurement implies positive law. With this
insight he was content
; and here he fell short
of Mill. In the proper sense of the term not in
Comte s rather abusive sense Mill was a meta
physician ; that is to say, he was concerned, like
Hume, with the first principles of knowledge or
science. He could not be content till he had
determined on what most general ground we are
entitled to assert one fixed order and no other in
each particular case.
We may see this even where Mill is thought to
have failed. Take Comte s opening mathematical
chapters. He starts with a discussion of the end
of mathematical science, not indeed its practical
end, but its end as pure theory. This he defines
as indirect measurement. Then he applies his
immense analytic and synthetic power to determine
and classify its methods. The problem, how we
know mathematical propositions to be true, is
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scarcely touched. Essentially he regards mathe
matics as a natural science of given phenomena.
A problem like that raised by Kant does not exist
for him. Mill, on the other hand, though not in
close contact with Kant s thought, regards the
question about the evidence of geometrical axioms
as fundamental. Are they synthetic judgments
a priori, or are they generalisations from ex
perience
? His conclusion that they are general
isations from experience is not now accepted, at
least in the form he gave to it
; but he dealt with
the problem.
Where Mill completely succeeded was in putting
the logic of Induction on a firm basis. To begin
with, he had been thoroughly trained in the
scholastic logic and its Aristotelian original, and
knew exactly what it could do and could not do.
With a view partly to refuting the indiscriminate
prejudice against it that had reigned in scientific
quarters since the seventeenth century, and was
only now beginning to give way, he first worked
out the theory of Syllogism on lines of his own.
Only when he had disposed of this did he go on
to Induction, by which he was for a long time
stopped. The question was, How can we get,
from the result of a particular experiment, a
general law which we know to be true? The
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formal logicians had little to say on this. What
they called perfect induction was a barren
summary of particulars already known, not a
process leading to new knowledge. An impression
was left that scientific induction all of it formally
imperfect is a kind of mystery, producing con
viction no one can say how. This air of mystery
Mill at length dissipated. Certain forms of ex
perimental method/ he showed, yield a valid
general conclusion because it can be seen that no
conclusion but this is compatible with the axiom
called the uniformity of nature. The expression
he chose for this uniformity was the law of
causation/ which he stated as the proposition
that every event has an invariable and uncon
ditional antecedent/ which we call its cause.
That is. to say, there is some determinate phen
omenon or group of phenomena, the existence of
which being given, the phenomenon we call the
effect will follow. His attempt to assign the
ground of our belief in this law itself, like his
theory of mathematical axioms, has not found
permanent acceptance; but none the less his
determination of the valid forms of inductive
inference remains definitive. This does not mean
that it was incapable of improvement, or even that
he left it relatively as perfect as Aristotle left the
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theory of syllogistic logic. Physical science has
been going on ever since, and logicians formulate
and justify its methods after they have been
invented, not before. It is now generally admitted,
for example, that Mill underrated the place of
deduction^ from hypotheses in physical science.
L theory of rational deduction that was in
great part true, but he limited it too much to a
tracing of the consequences of known generalisa
tions from experience. There is more place than
he cared to allow for conjecture as the starting-
point of deduction of course with a view to
verification by facts. But, as far as the process of
induction is concerned, the new organon that
Bacon had called for was at last created. Eyer)
induction was shown to imply at once some
^articular experience, and a deduction from the
law of causation assumed to be universal. There
can be a system of scientific truths, because nature
as seen in the relation of cause and effect is
With respect to the idea itself of cause/ Mill
and Comte differ only in the form of expression.
When Comte rejects the use of the word, and
prefers to speak only of law, he means to dismiss
ontological causes, supposed realities behind
phenomena that have intrinsic power or efficacy
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to produce certain effects. Mill retains it because
he thinks it is most properly regarded simply as
a name for the phenomenal antecedents that
invariably and unconditionally precede their
phenomenal consequents. The negative result
of Hume s analysis is accepted, implicitly or
explicitly, by both. We have no knowledge of
any power in the cause to produce this effect
rather than that, or of any tie between the cause
and the effect. The laws of nature are pheno
menal laws, not laws of things-in-themselves,
and our knowledge of them depends wholly on
experience.
Nevertheless there is in Comte a negative
dogmatism to which Mill did not commit himself,
and which he did not hold as a belief. Comte
has at bottom no doubt that a real world of
mindless objectivity composes the sum of existence
prior to the appearance of animal life. On the
origin of life, as on the origin of man, he has no
theory. His position is distinguished from
materialism by the rejection, on principle, of
every attempt to derive the higher from the
lower. Thus he can take an essentially teleo-
logical view both of life and mind. A true pro
vidential order, he holds, has been introduced
into the world by man. He has no objection to
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the association of this doctrine historically with
a teleological optimism like that of Leibniz. Yet,
while he rejects the name of atheism (with
some asperity, as Mill remarks), the rejection
means only that he has no interest in atheistic
cosmogonies. His objection to them indeed is
that they are in essence a kind of theology or
metaphysics, seeking explanation where the
human mind can find none. He would not even
permit a speculative interest in the physical
universe beyond the solar system, because
nothing external to this can have any sufficiently
direct bearing on the human lot. With the
humanistic, as against an attempted cosmic,
point of view, Mill had much sympathy ; but he
was more aware than Cointe ever became that
the limitations of objective science are narrower
than those of the human mind, v
Mill s metaphysical positions are to be found
partly in the Logic, but chiefly in the Examina
tion of Sir William Hamilton s Philosophy
(1865). This treatise was written, as he has him
self explained, with an aim that was ultimately
practical. He regarded the kind of philosophis
ing rather vaguely called Intuitionism as the
enemy of all reform, because its tendency was to
treat mere customary associations of ideas, dis-COMTE AND MILL
soluble by analysis, as necessary truths known
prior to experience. Of this philosophy Sir
W. Hamilton (178N-1856) seemed to him the
best and strongest representative ; descending as
he did from the Scottish school of Common Sense
founded by Reid, but deriving some of his ideas
from Kant, and generally impressive by the
copiousness of his learning. To Kant and his
successors, representing the latest phase^ of
Continental Rationalism (as distinguished from
English Experientialism), eclectic thinkers both
in France and England had turned under the
impression that this was somehow an antidote to
the irreligious philosophy of the eighteenth
century descending from Locke. Hence arose
hybrid philosophies like those of Cousin, of
Whewell, of Hamilton himself, and of Hamilton s
disciple Hansel. The relations to religion on
both sides, if we take the complete historical
series in England and on the Continent, are rather
varied. Mill has noticed the paradox that in
his time those who regarded the law of causation
as an intuitive truth were understood to allow
miracles, and those who derived it only from
experience to reject them. The controversy that
burst forth over the Examination of Hamilton
(in which Mansel also was dealt with) may be
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considered as having closed this particular phase
of the opposing philosophies in England.
Successors may be found both of the Intui-
tionists and of Mill, but none would now class
themselves precisely with either side.
Much of the Examination of Hamilton is
constructive. In pure philosophy the most
effective chapters are those in which Mill has
restated and developed Berkeley s idealism as
against the natural realism or natural dualism
of the Common Sense school. According to this
characteristic doctrine of Reid and Hamilton,
consciousness has an immediate intuition of its
object in contrast with itself. Matter and mind
are directly known as antithetic realities.
Against this, Mill worked out on psychological
grounds a positive explanation of our belief in
the external world, reducing what we come to
know of matter wholly to phenomena and their
relations. The grounds were furnished partly by
Reid s successor, Thomas Brown, who had
developed the Scottish philosophy in the direction
of Associationism, and partly by Professor Bain,
then rising as an original psychologist of the
Associationist school. Having defined matter,
in a phrase that has become famous, as per
manent possibility of sensation, Mill goes on to
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investigate the nature of the psychological
subject. This he finds more resistant to analysis
than the object. If we call mind a
e series of
feelings/ we must add that it is aware of itself
as a series/ and this makes it something quite
peculiar and not finally explicable. Thus he
remains in the end nearer to Berkeley than to
Hume (whose Treatise perhaps he had not read).
Mind is for him ultimately more real than
matter.
Against
all attempts to establish necessary y
truths on the mere deliverance of consciousness,*^
he urges the law of inseparable association/
recurring here to his father s Analysis. He
would like to reduce not only arithmetical and
geometrical axioms, but the formal laws of
thought, to generalisations from experience.
Free-will, which Hamilton made the basis of
morals, he declines to accept as a deliverance of
consciousness; but puts forward a doctrine
of his own which, while fundamentally deter-
minist, allows in each person a certain power to
modify his own character if he has the desire.
From ethical theism, as we can now see in the
light of his later work, he is not averse. Indeed
he shows himself rather anxious to prove, in
opposition to sceptical theologians who would
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ground theism itself on belief in revelation, that
the idea of a God with moral attributes is not
irrational. What he will have nothing to do
with is an ontology of the Absolute, such as
Hamilton and Mansel attempt to combine with
personal theism and acceptance of revealed
religion. At the point where an ontology of his
ovfu, differing from that of his antagonists, might
fiave been expected, his idealistic theory breaks
qfL It serves merely to limit dogmatic affirma
tions, without suggesting any doctrine concerning
the reality of the universe that goes beyond
particular scientific hypotheses. In later chapters
we shall see more in detail both his likeness and
unlikeness here to Comte.
45CHAPTER V
THE RELIGION OF HUMANITY
BETWEEN the last volume of the Philosophie
Positive and the first of the Politique Positive
there took place what is sometimes regarded as
a revolution in Comte s manner of thinking. In
definitely returning from the laws of social
development to a scheme of social reconstruc
tion, he no longer called himself simply a philo
sopher, but came forward as the founder of a
religion. This has been explained by thorough
going disciples as merely a change in expression.
In his earlier works he spoke uniformly as if
rejecting everything that was called religion, and
made philosophy the highest name. But by
religion/ it is said, he then meant only theology.
Later he distinguished more exactly, and, while
continuing to reject every theology, took religion
instead of philosophy for the name of what is
highest in his synthesis. This may serve as aTHE RELIGION OF HUMANITY
partial explanation ; but there was also something
unforeseen. The germinal ideas of the social
reconstruction that afterwards took form are
indeed present in the earlier works, but the
organised cult of humanity is new. The men
of science or philosophers who constitute the
revived spiritual power are now not merely
successors of the mediaeval clergy, but are defi
nitely clothed with sacerdotal attributes. The
ideal for the future is theocracy minus theology.
The sciences are conceived as co-ordinated finally
in authorised text-books in a way that was hardly
prefigured in the first outlines, where we were
left to suppose special theoretical researches still
going on in freedom side by side with the work
of the class that is to co-ordinate them. And
Comte at first had an apparently clearer sense
that the work of co-ordination could not be done
once for all by any one man. There is in him,
after the completion of the Philosophic Positive,
an undeniable exaltation/ as Littre called it.
The revolution, however, is more apparent than
real. Ajvell-known distinctive point in his later
system, for example, is the supreme position
assigned to the life of the affections. To this,
in the ideal order, the intellectual life will be
secondary, while practical activity comes third.
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Mill, in his Auguste Comte and Positivism, traced
this prescription for mankind in general to the
circumstances of Comte s life. With his disposi
tion to organise everything, he would have made
the life of feeling supreme for all during the
whole of life, because during the short period of
his attachment to Madame Clotilde de Vaux
(before her death in 1846) he himself had found
full satisfaction in it. In an earlier correspon
dence, however (not published when Mill wrote),
Comte had expressed precisely the same view.
In fact, a biographical explanation no more
applies than in the somewhat similar case of
Mill himself, who has pointed out that his
advocacy of equal social and political rights for
both sexes was not originally due to the influence
of his wife. His position that justice absolutely
demands equality dated from his youth, when he
had maintained it against his father s view, inci
dentally expressed, that democratic government
does not strictly require that women should take
part in electing representatives. The mental
history of both philosophers, it may be observed,
suggests something very like innate ideas.
An occasion for bringing forward his new con
ceptions with practical effect seemed to offer itself
to Comte in the Revolution of 1848. It was in
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that year that he published his Discours sur
I Ensemble du Positivisme, afterwards incorpor
ated in the first volume of the Politique Positive.
From the chiefs of revolutions and reactions
alike, however, nothing but discouragement was
to come to him. We may completely assent to
what his disciples say of his heroic persistence
in his own course, now as during the rest of his
life. At the same time, there came in more and
more an element of illusion that was absent from
his first period. The new religion, he predicted
later, would have received official recognition in
Europe at the end of a century from the Revolu
tion of 1789. He himself, if he lived long enough,
would be saluted as the High Priest of Humanity.
But to say more on this is not worth while, even
if there were space. The social reconstruction
forms an imaginative synthesis not affected in
its real interest by failure, actual or prospective,
to realise itself in the expression that Comte
gave to it.
His later doctrine is expounded in the Systeme
de Politique Positive (4 vols., 1851-1854) and in
the Synthese Subjective ( 1856). The superiority,
in some respects, of these works over the earlier
ones is admitted even by Mill, who was least in
sympathy with them. Their retrograde character
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is seen chiefly in the growing antipathy, which
Mill notes, to intellect as such. But, as an intel
lectual structure, they themselves rise above the
earlier works, both in discrimination and in
breadth of view, not to speak of the advance
generally allowed as regards imagination and feel
ing. The superiority may be seen especially in
the historical exposition
; where it was less to be
looked for, since Comte was more preoccupied
than he had been formerly with order as dis
tinguished from progress, with what he called
social statics as distinguished from dynamics.
The religious type of Western Asia is now far
more clearly marked off than in the Philosophy
from that of Greece and Rome. The highly
organised theocracy of the first type is classed
as distinctively industrial rather than military.
Thus the term theologico-military, as a general
name for the old order, loses its typical value,
though it is never quite discarded. Progressive
took the place of conservative polytheism,
Comte now finds, precisely through the superior
position gained in the West by the military class.
This was at most adumbrated in the funda
mental work. In the Philosophy, the revolu
tionary transition essentially kept in view con
sisted only of the five modern centuries from the
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end of the thirteenth. In the Polity, the analogy
of the modern West to ancient Greece being
more clearly seen, the break-up of the old order
is found to occupy (with intermediate reactions)
thirty centuries from the Homeric age. If the
unfairness to the critical periods has become
intensified, the insight into their analogies has
deepened. There is added further a remarkable
speculation on prehistoric man. Before the typi
cal theocracy, Comte places a kind of fetishistic
Golden Age, in which man felt himself at one
with nature, conceived as universally animated.
An interesting suggestion is thrown out that it
was at this stage that animals were first domesti
cated. Man, being then less removed from them
in intelligence and sympathy, could put himself
with more spontaneity in relation with them.
The period of force and dominance came later.
Had it been necessary to begin by violent
subjugation, no taming could ever have been
effected.
These, however, are relatively subordinate
developments. Both in method and in doctrine,
Comte s later phase is marked by one unquestion
able advance of the highest scientific generality.
At first Sociology was conceived by him as the
supreme science. He held it to be dependent onCOMTE AND MILL
Biology as the next in order in the hierarchy.
From Biology (or a special department of it)
sociological laws must be deduced. He had seen,
however, from the first, that Sociology is not
wholly thus dependent. It has a method and a
doctrine of its own : namely, the historical method
and the law of the three states. But this brings
into relief another aspect of the individual man.
By the time he had completed the Cours de Philo
sophic Positive, Comte perceived the necessity
of a revision, as he told Mill in their correspon
dence. Hitherto the individual had not been
explicitly considered at all, except as a biological
organism. This point of view he now perceived
to be even more inadequate than he had thought.
Individuality had seemed at first to be a mere
biological notion, and then to be effaced under the
conception of a social unity. From Comte s later
point of view the individual person in the full
sense can be restored as an object of science, not
indeed as a unit that enters into society, but as
determined by sociological laws. There is a true
science of man as individual ; but it is posterior,
not prior, to Sociology. To this science Cointe
gave the name of Morality, making it the seventh
in his [hierarchy. Moral science being conceived
as supreme, all below must be ordered from its
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point of view. With this conception there
naturally goes (according to his social scheme)
the position that the philosophers or priests are,
above all, to be moral teachers. Being the
educators of the community, they will direct
practice from the ethical point of view, to which
all intellectual pursuits can now more definitely
than ever be subordinated.
Theoretically, it must be noted that Comte s
new science is properly not ethics, but psychology
of the individual. For such a science, his insight
into its true relation to sociology is undoubtedly
of immense importance; but he failed to dis
tinguish it from moral philosophy, which is not
the same thing. Just as he does not discuss
philosophically the criterion of scientific know
ledge, but takes it for granted, so he does not
discuss the criterion of action, but supposes it to
emerge as a matter of course from his theoretical
moral science. lie has, indeed, an ethical
doctrine, but it is nowhere critically justified.
His ethical principle is Love or Altruism. The
supreme precept of his morality is Live for
others. Sympathetic as well as selfish feelings,
he finds, arc in fact innate in man though they
are weaker. In the stages of human history, in
spite of this weakness, altruism slowly gets the
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better of egoism. Taking the historical view as
sufficient, and passing over critical questions
about the proof for the individual conscience,
supposed autonomous, and claiming the right to
give or refuse its assent according to the reason
of the case, he goes straight to the practical social
question. The principle granted, as he thinks it
cannot but be, how is it to be brought to bear
systematically on every action ? His answer is,
by a religion, the Religion of Humanity. On
Humanity as the highest form of life upon earth,
the Great Being of the planet, each person
depends for all that he is and does. Humanity,
we have seen, is an organism in a higher than the
biological sense, its continuity is that of history
and not of merely organic life. It is a real
providence, in distinction from the imaginary
supra-mundane providence of the theologians.
Thus it becomes for us the supreme object of
devotion. Through the graduated unities offamily
first, then city or country, the individual rises to
the conception of the highest real being known to
him, having a life in the past and in the future
that far transcends the mere present. Humanity,
then, can become the object of a cult, of which
the devotion to incarnate gods or goddesses was
an adumbration. Of this cult the founder of the
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religion proceeded to draw up the outlines and a
considerable part of the details.
The new religion is the Religion of Humanity
not only in the sense that its practice issues in the
service of man, but also in the sense that it is
destined to become finally the religion of the
human race. From its beginnings in the central
people of Western Europe, where it is directly the
heir of Catholic monotheism, it will spread over
the rest of the world, aiding the populations that
have remained polytheist or fetishist to rise to the
stage of positivity without the painful theological
and metaphysical transition that has been
necessary in the historic past. Agreement having
been arrived at intellectually, the religion will
aim at the systematic cultivation of the sym
pathetic feelings by exciting emotions of love
and gratitude. The cult, in the definitive order,
will be both public and private. Woman as
domestic goddess will be the object of the private
cult. In its public form, the adoration of
Humanity will be organised in a series of feasts
dedicated to the constituent elements and stages
of man s life impersonally conceived, the private
cult being directed rather to personal objects.
The well-known Positivist Calendar is intended
only to prepare the way for this definitive form
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of Sociolatry. The months and weeks and days
of the provisional calendar are dedicated to the
great names, theoretical and practical, that stand
for all the progressive movements from the initial
Theocracy to the modern Republic of the West/
consisting of the five advanced populations/
French, Italian, Spanish, British, and Germanic.
The dating to be brought into use in substitution
for the preceding era of Europe is in years of the
great crisis/ the opening of the French Revolu
tion in 1789 being taken as the beginning.
I do not propose here to give any account of
the hierarchical order to be imposed on the
society of the future. As a scheme to be adopted
outright, few Positivists now accept it
; though, if
not taken too literally, others as well as Positivists
may find in it suggestions of great value con
cerning the stages of an encyclopaedic education
and the practical ordering of life. I pass on to give
a few points from Comte s last work, the Synthese
Subjective, which represents in some respects the
highest stage of his thought.
No more than the rest of his later writings
is it a reversal of his earlier doctrine. It is,
as he maintained, a completion of it from the
other term of the series. The stages in his
hierarchy of the sciences he still holds to be
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objectively given; but his view all along was
that they lead up to man as the end. Every
thing, then, has to be gone over again from the
human point of view when this has at last
become positive. The sciences in general, objec
tive though they be, were never supposed to be
other than relative
; and this means finally that
they are relative to man. That is to say, no
objective synthesis
is attainable. The only
possible synthesis is subjective. This does not
mean that it is merely individual. A subjective
synthesis is attainable from the point of view
of humanity and not merely of some particular
tllinker. But no synthesis is objectively universal.
The objectivity that exists is only that of abstract
science, and carries with it no knowledge of the
whole.
This is, I think, a fair representation of Comte s
thought. He did not live to work it out in full,
but in the only volume published of what was to
be a third series of writings (after the Philosophy
and the Polity), he applied it to mathematics,
always in his view the fundamental science both
as regards method and doctrine. The most
remarkable part of this volume is the opening
section, in which the Religion of Humanity is
extended to the universe or at least to that
57COMTE AND MILL
portion of it with which man is in effective rela
tion by what is confessedly poetic fiction. The
fictions of the theologians, according to Comte,
were of course not deliberate. Primeval fetishism,
the fundamental form of theology/ by which
objects were endowed not only with will and
feeling, but with intelligence, was a spontaneous
belief. Like later theologies in their degree, it
served the purpose of giving to human curiosity
a sufficient stimulus till the formulation of posi
tive laws could be substituted for the futile search
after causes. The positive philosopher, how
ever, when the whole series of stages has been
traversed, may deliberately restore in the con
templation of nature what he knows to be a
purely subjective and human mode of thought.
First, the birthplace and home of man may be
endowed with sympathy and will for human
good. An imaginative extension of this hypo
thesis makes the Earth the Great Fetish, as
Man is the Great Being. Further, to abstract
laws we may assign as their seat Space, which
thus becomes the Great Medium/ imagined not
indeed as actively volitional like the Earth, but
as benevolent. Space, the Earth, and Man form
the Positivist Trinity. The other planets of the
solar system may be regarded in like manner as
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animated, and the Sun and Moon especially may
be made the subject of poetic personifications.
Unaware, probably, of the remarkable coin
cidences between these suggestions and the
personifications in the last Act of Prometheus
Unbound, Comte leaves them to the poets of the
future. By Shelley, it is worth observing, not
only these fictions, which with the poet were
of course no less fictions than with the philo
sopher, but many of Comte s distinctive theoretic
ideas were anticipated. The glorified humanity
of the future is conceived not in terms of atomic
individualism, but as the Great Being Man, not
men. To develop this further might seem to the
reader fanciful; but the comparison was worth
making in order to show how easily the general
conception of a Religion of Humanity can be
cleared of what is merely personal in it. And,
indeed, Comte himself, in this last stage, is visibly
getting beyond anything that may appear to us
sectional in his choice of models. From the
typical mediaeval conception of the world, with
its agency of external spirits acting on matter,
nothing could be more remote.
59CHAPTER VI
MILL S POLITICS, ECONOMICS, AND ETHICS
IT has been mentioned that Mill derived from
Comte the Inverse Deductive or Historical
Method, which he finally came to regard as the
only possible method for the more complex
investigations in the science of society. This is
set forth in the sixth book of the Logic ( On the
Logic of the Moral Sciences
). At an earlier
stage of his political thinking he had already
received an impression from Comte, and had
come under the influence of the Saint-Simonians,
as may be seen in the letters to his friend
Gustave d Eichthal, who was a member of the
group. The contact was one of those that con
tributed to modify his Benthamism, others being
his relations with what may be called generally
the counter-revolutionary movement in England.
Here, as in France, recognition that errors had in
fact been swept away was accompanied in many
60MILL S POLITICS, ECONOMICS,AND ETHICS
educated minds by a disposition to find, mainly
in the order that had been singled out as the
object of revolutionary hate, something more
noble and beautiful than that which seemed to
be taking its place. The structure of Catholic
feudalism and the mediaeval Church attracted not
only theological reactionaries, but some who, like
Carlyle, saw that the old system of belief was
irreparably destroyed. It is noteworthy that
Hegel, for all his Prussian conservatism, never
took this direction, but sought a true organic
base, as against mere anarchism, not essentially
in a Church at all, but in the classical or the
modern national State. This, as an organic
order, had not impressed any of the minds by
which Mill was especially influenced. And, as
he had never abandoned what Comte called the
revolutionary metaphysics, the effect of the new
influences was not one of unqualified attraction.
He was willing to find something impressive in
the mediaeval past that periods like the eighteenth
century had lost, but the critical spirit remained
alert. E[e found already in Comte s early
Politique Positive an excess of system, and
remarked on the special favour he shows to the
Middle Ages as contrasted with his unfairness to
classical antiquity. Mill himself might come to
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\ be over-impressed later by the rehabilitation of
the Middle Ages ; but the large part played by
Greek studies in his early education gave him
the superiority over Comte in actual knowledge
concerning the other term of the contrast. To
the Saint-Simonians, with their zeal for industrial
production/ he insisted on the disadvantages
that accompany the success in it in England,
which they were disposed to envy. A profound
\ egoism of tone, not merely in formed men of the
x- world, but in young men, who in France and
Germany are usually full of generous enthusiasm,
is what he finds to result from the predominance
f the life of commerce. With the aspirations of
e Saint-Simonians to a new order of society,
and even to a new religion, he was at the same
\ time completely in sympathy, though already
v \fraid of the sectarian spirit which would try to
impress on entire communities a single direction
to be fixed by the doctrine of a school.
Before the time of his correspondence with
Comte, he had found himself obliged to give up
the rigorous position of his father, set forth in the
article~^on Government. Macaulay s attack in
the Edinburgh Review (1829) had convinced him
that what he_ afterwards called the geometrical
method of direct deduction from principles of
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human nature, .cannpt_j[ive^_valid propositions
applicable to the whole of^a society. The purely
experimental or chemical method (as he called
it later) of Macaulay is, however, equally invalid.
Specific experience is here too complicated to
permit the application of the inductive methods.
The method has to be some kind of scientific
deduction. With abstract Political Economy he
had
no^sjjedaljliffi^ulty;..
; _Ifjneji _are assumed to
be actuated only by one class of motives in
thTs^case^ those that refer to wealth then the
problem is sufficiently simplified to be treated
in the manner of a deductive science like
astronomy or physics. ^Having reached con
clusions hypothetically valid, we can correct them
by restoring the data provisionally set aside.
When, however, all the phenomena of a society
are to be taken into account at once, the con
sensus of its elements deprives us of the resource
furnished by this kind of abstraction. For the
problem of method thus left over, he found the
solution, as has been said, in Comte. With some
reserves intended to conciliate English prejudice
regarding Comte s use of the term theo
logical, he also accepted his doctrine expressed
in the law of the three states. Further than
this it cannot be said that he ever proceeded in
X p^a J^^i^ L^
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Sociology as a science. The later developments
of his own thought in its application to society
were in Economics, in Politics considered as a
practical art depending to some extent on philo
sophical principles, and in the theory of Ethics.
A project referred to in the correspondence
with Comte, but not carried out, was a work on
the science Mill called Ethology, or the formation
of human character, regarded as derivative from
Psychology, or the science of the elementary laws
of mind. This, in Mill s view, would have been
a step on the way to a scientific Sociology. The
lines on which it was conceived were, however,
individualistic in the sense in which Comte
was now fully aware of his own advance on
individualism. Mill came to perceive that his
scheme was, at least for the present, impracticable,
and turned instead to the subject of Political
Economy, with the development of which, up
to the point it had reached, he was perfectly
familiar. Here again there was a divergence
from Comte, who, though not condemning out
right Mill s project of a treatise on economics, in
reality thought the abstract science of the
economists of very slight value. He had already
expressed himself to this effect. The separate
treatment of the phenomena of wealth, in his
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view, was the source of antithetic errors : in
dustrial laissez-faire on the one side, and social
istic schemes for nationalising the instruments
of production on the other. The only kind of
social science that could henceforth give any true
guidance was a science of social phenomena in
their totality. Mill, however, seeing no clear
light in this direction, and retaining his belief
in economics within its own limits, now began
his second great treatise, the Principles of
Political Economy, which appeared in 1848.
What gave the work its essential interest for
him was the hope, by application of the new
doctrines attained since Adam Smith by Ricardo
and Maithus, to point the way to social reform.
In particular, the doctrine of Malthus on popula
tion was applied by him to refute despairing
views as to the future of the labouring classes.
Population, it is true, by its unchecked increase
tends to press on the means of subsistence, and
thus to reduce the remuneration of the labourer
tcT~n6~~&quot;more than will support life ; but the
standard of living can be raised, and the increase
of population brought under control by prudence.
All through, Mill showed himself anxious to
mark the limitations of the economic view. If
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fixed, the laws of its distribution (lifter according
to the customs and the social order of different
societies, and a better order may be thought out
I tKanThat which exists. The ^present distribution
\ is so unjust that even a scheme of communistic
; equality would be preferable ; and, if communism
1 can be reconciled with the free play of individu-
j ality, this may be the ideal order to be realised
in the future. Mill, however, will not resign
individual freedom. He puts forward no scheme
I of his own that can be called properly socialistic.
In spite of the new influences under which he
had come, his work could in fact be regarded as
a text-book of the classical political economy,
for which laissez-faire was the general rule ad
mitting only of occasional exceptions.
Another point of difference between Mill and
/ Comte related to the position and the mental
^qualities of women. On biological grounds,
A iComte argues that women are intellectually in-
\ \ \ferior to men. This Mill cannot admit. All
actual differences are to be traced to circum-
. stances, such as mode of education, opinion of
\society constantly impressed, and so forth. No
legal or political difference ought to exist. This
was afterwards the thesis maintained with passion
in The Subjection of Women (1869). Mill came
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to think later that in the correspondence he had
made too many concessions. The deep cleft,
however, between his view and Comte s is mani
fest. The weakness of his position controversially
is on the biological side. He will hardly admit
at any time, whether in discussing sex or race,
that any mental difference whatever can be trace
able to the organism. His strength is in the
feeling that justice between the sexes, as in every
other relation, implies a certain equality as its
condition. Economic dependence legally enforced,
for example, is incompatible with this. In com- \
menting on the deification of women in the \
Positive Polity as the moral providence, he
l)
remarks that Comte concedes to them everything /
except justice. Comte s view about the impor-
*
tance of the relative superiorities on each, side
had to some extent changed, but his practical
inference as regards social institutions remained
the same.
In the sphere of politics, each point in turn
could be treated as a case of antithesis between
the two thinkers. Mill s Representative Govern
ment (1861), for instance, takes up the problem
of developing precisely that political system which
Comte regarded not only as transitional but as
already superseded. For Comte, the way to the
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ideal order is henceforth through a series of
dictatorships. Democracy as a permanent system
is anarchical. Now Mill, while he was always
a democrat, came to fear rather that the rule of
the numerical majority would tend to suppress
individual variation. Hence he shows himself
eager to adopt any device that may be proposed
for reducing this danger. Parliamentary institu
tions in general he accepts above all because of
the educational value of voting and discussion
for the individual citizen. A benevolent des
potism, though not to be condemned in all times
and places, since the historical relativity of
institutions must be recognised, would not be
the best form of government even if it were the
most efficient. Whether the particular devices
taken up by Mill are such as to promote the ends
he had at heart is a disputed question; but
events have not refuted either his own doctrine
or that of the school from which he sprang, as
far as their hopes lay in the development of a
parliamentary as distinguished from a dictatorial
system.
Mill s most famous contribution to the defence
of individuality is of course the Liberty (1859).
This is first of all a philosophical defence of
freedom in the expression of opinion, especially
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when opposed to popular orthodoxy. Here at
last Mill was able to plead with effect, as he
had long desired, for intellectual liberty against
the silencing, by social intolerance, of open dis
belief in Christianity. In an often-quoted passage
where the defects of Christian as contrasted with
the best pagan ethics are insisted on, he gave an
illustration of the freedom he claimed. The
persuasiveness and eloquence of the writing
helped to win the cause, in England, of free
thought and speech. Although some who agree
in Mill s general conclusion do not find the proof
as stringent as might be desired, none deny the
effectiveness of the plea at the time; and the
Liberty has taken classical rank with Milton s
argument for unlicensed printing. To a logical
persecutor, doubtless, neither the Liberty nor the
Areopagitica would carry conviction; but both
came at a time when the public mind was slowly
becoming more sensitive to the interests of truth
and justice; and the literary rather than
technically philosophical clothing of the argu
ments did not tell against them.
What has perhaps been most commented on
in the Liberty is the contention for limitations on
the control exercised by society over the actions
of the individual. Not merely freedom of
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thought, but practical experiments in living/
ought, in Mill s view, to be encouraged as against
the tendency, which he feared in modern civilisa
tion and in political democracy, to an enforced
uniformity. Here especially we see the thinker
who had shown himself so sensitive in youth
to the influences of the counter-revolution.
Wordsworth and Coleridge, we must remember,
were in reaction first against the European
tyranny by which the Revolution was followed,
and had cared much less about temporary
anarchy. Again, through social interactions
which it would take long to discuss, Mill s
argument against pressing the coercion of public
opinion too far has been taken up by later con
servative thinkers. Hence this side of his
thought, by enabling both parties to appeal to
it, has indirectly helped to strengthen the
authority of his name.
The principal statement of Mill s ethics is the
Utilitarianism, which appeared first in Fraser s
Magazine in 1861, and was separately published
in 1863. While guarding himself against what
he thinks the errors of Comte s teaching in so
far as it overrides the claims of liberty and
individuality, Mill here in effect adopts the
Religion of Humanity. The supreme end of action
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is human happiness, under which is included
j
(as also by Comte) the happiness of other sentient/
beings in relation with man. Of_the. .properl/
philosophical positions connected with acceptances
of this as the end, Mill attempts such proof as
he thinks them capable of. There, is an express
argument against the transcendentailst view
that justice is irreducible to utility (or con-
duciveness to happiness), and can only be derived
from an immediate intuition of what is univer
sally obligatory without reference to ends. The
feeling for justice, like other moral sentiments,
is found to have its origin in assignable circum
stances of human history, and to acquire its
peculiar character in the individual from the
type of moral education that has been determined
by those circumstances. In the case of the
Utilitarianism as of the Liberty, those who are
in general agreement with Mill s conclusions have
not found his proofs in all respects satisfactory.
What has been most frequently disputed from
one side or the other is the modification attempted
by him in Bentham s definition or description of
happiness. For Bentham, happiness consists of
pleasures quantitatively estimated, pains being
deducted as negative. The net sum the
greatest possible happiness is the end. Millx rkn ^iwr ^ W^KI */iH**/r
COMTE AND MILL
(after Plato in the Republic) proposes to dis
tinguish pleasures as also qualitatively higher or
lower. Yet happiness is still regardedJbyjiim
as a sum. Thus, as opponents have pointed out,
all the apparent simplicity of Benthamism is
destroyed, while its principle is not expressly
abandoned. Indeed, Mill incidentally accepts the
most rigorous Benthamic view in the admission
that the end is to maximise the sum without
reference to its distribution. An adherent of
utilitarianism like Professor Bain holds therefore
that it would have been better tactics if Mill had
declined to commit himself to any but the
broadest statement of the utilitarian position,
which is not specially Benthamic. The only
difference of quality, relative to ethics, that Bain
can admit, is the difference between egoistic and
altruistic feelings. This too is a departure from
rigorous Benthamism. An obvious objection to
Mill s use of the principle of inseparable associa
tion to explain the origin of moral sentiments
is that this seems to reduce them to illusions
destructible by analysis. It is indeed paradoxical
that Associationists, having shown how, for
example, the love of money arises from associa
tion of means with the ends of action, till at last
they come to be substituted for the ends them-
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selves as the object of desire, should complacently
argue that the regard for moral virtue is psycho
logically explicable in the same way. Mill is
conscious of the difficulty, and in one place gives
an answer by pointing out that love of virtue
is so far natural to man as not to be dissolved
by analysis when it has been acquired; but on
the whole his hopes were so much in educability
that he preferred to dwell on the power of
teachers and legislators to produce by public or
private education any type of character they
choose. Since he wrote, ethical discussion has
taken new forms through the entrance into
the controversy of factors like evolution and
the social medium. Practically innate moral
sentiments, according to the Spencerian theory
of evolution, have their source in the experience
of the race, though the experience of the in
dividual cannot wholly account for them. Again,
from the Positivist or the Hegelian point of view,
if man is a social being before he is properly man,
the attempt to derive the profoundest moral
sentiments from an explicit mental process in
the individual is an inversion of the true order.
All this, however, belongs to the psychology of
ethics rather than to ethics proper. The rational
problem of ends and criteria remains. Of this
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the new factors furnish no ready-made solution
;
but only, like the Associationist psychology itself
at an earlier stage, contribute materials for the
ethical philosopher. It may be said of Mill that
he was primarily a philosopher or logician rather
than a psychologist, and in his time cleared the
discussion of many irrelevancies.
74CHAPTER VII
THE ESSAYS ON RELIGION
THE year 1873 saw the publication of Mill s Auto
biography. In 1874 appeared the posthumous
essays on Nature/ The Utility of Religion/ and
Theism. Of these the first two were composed
during the period between 1850 and 1858, to
which belongs also the composition of the Liberty
and the Utilitarianism. The third was written
much later, and had been very imperfectly re
vised. It was not the kind of work that had
been expected either by Mill s friends or by his
opponents ; yet it is not really inconsistent with
anything he had written elsewhere on religion.
While Mill is often classed as having the type
of mind of the eighteenth century, the essay on
Nature contains the strongest possible attack on
a favourite abstraction of that period. Against
every attempt to find moral guidance for man
in nature unmodified by human agency, Mill
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proclaims war. Natural forces act in ways that
would be regarded as involving the highest
degree of criminality in human agents. When
we turn to man himself, we find that what is
best in him is artificial, being the comparatively
late product of culture. Nature s god and the
noble savage are sophistic fancies. The only
morally admissible theory of Creation, in view of
the facts both of nature and of human history,
is that the Principle of Good is limited by ex
traneous conditions
; that not otherwise than by
struggle with the powers of evil, and by gradual
growth, could the moral order of civilised human
life be attained.
The next essay starts from the discussion in
the work entitled Analysis of the Influence of
Natural Religion on the Temporal Happiness
ofMankind, by Philip Beauchamp (1822). This
is now known to have been written by George
Grote, with assistance from the fragmentary
manuscripts of Bentham. Its conclusions are
completely hostile to the utility of theism, and,
by implication, of Christianity. Mill thinks that
it presses many parts of the argument too hard
;
and his own view allows some value historically
to the supernatural sanction as an aid to ethics.
In the end, however, he points out the danger of
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associating sound moral precepts with, doctrines
intellectually unsustainable, and for himself ex
plicitly accepts the Religion of Humanity, not
as an imperfect substitute for the supernatural
religions, but as equal to them in their best
manifestations and superior to them in any of
their others.
The essay on Theism develops the thought
expressed incidentally in the first essay, that, not
withstanding the spectacle presented by nature,
a moral theory of creation is admissible on the
hypothesis that the Deity is limited in power.
The limitation, Mill adds, may also be in know
ledge, and even in benevolence. Yet, if there
are any grounds for the belief in such a creative
God, this kind of theism may aid and fortify
the purely human religion which, with or with
out supernatural sanctions, he cannot doubt is
destined to be the Religion of the Future.
The grounds that Mill finds for this hypothesis
are essentially those that have always furnished a
basis for the design-argument. The eye appears
to have been made for seeing, and the ear for
hearing. The Darwinian theory, he recognises,
cannot be disregarded as one possible explanation
of the apparent adaptations of organisms to their
conditions; yet it does not seem to him to be
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more than plausible as a substitute for intelligent
design. On the whole, a creative God working
on matter is, he contends, still the theory for
which, as a speculation, most can be said.
Matter is, of course, taken here in its common-
sense meaning as something real and opposed to
mind. Mill, however, could easily have adapted
the argument to his own idealism. For the per
manent possibilities of sensation into which
matter is resolved by him metaphysically are
not to be supposed correspondent to nothing at
all. They may signify some non-rational condi
tions of the manifestation of intelligence. As to
the nature of these conditions, Mill does not
speculate. All that is necessary for him is that
they should be limiting conditions. His creative
Deity is clearly not the Absolute. He may be
the most powerful being in the universe, but he
is not to be identified with the reality of the
whole. Mill, as was noted before, does not regard
his own idealism as a possible foundation for
ontology. The only definite use he makes of it
is to show that it leaves room for a belief in the
natural immortality of the individual soul. That
it does not directly prove immortality he allows.
At the same time he points out that mind,
according to idealism, has a higher degree of
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reality than matter as phenomenally known.
Thus it may, notwithstanding anything that is
proved as to the impennanence of material com
binations, survive the organism in association
with which it has been temporarily manifested.
In theism, as distinguished from idealism, Mill
finds very little to confirm the belief in immor
tality. The most that can be made out is that
it permits the hope for a future state as a possi
bility. Generally his treatment here gives ground
for the view that he would like to discover some
residue of truth in the doctrines of natural
theology, though not for the inference that he
felt any need of them himself. In pantheistic or
evolutionary speculations it is clear that he felt
no interest. Hence he remains in the end more
in sympathy with the tenets common to Chris
tian and non-Christian theists than Comte, the
fictions of whose subjective synthesis have a
decided affinity with the monistic ontology which
he nevertheless completely repudiated. And
Comte, with all his admiration for the Catholic
type of life, makes no such concession to the
claim that there is anything unique in Christian
ethics as is made by Mill in the section of his last
essay which he devotes to Revelation.
To whichever side our sympathies may incline,
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both philosophers here give us less satisfaction
than we have intellectually a right to expect, and
point to something beyond themselves. Hypo
theses or fictions may be permissible ; but in
philosophy we ought to have grounds for saying,
as Plato did of his myths, that the meaning
contained in them, though not any particular
imagination we can clothe it with, is the truth of
things. For a religion, Comte s dogmatic asser
tions, whether negative or positive, seem at any
rate more satisfying than Mill s suspension of
judgment. The Positivist subjective immor
tality, or preservation in the memory of
survivors, for example, is held out as a certainty.
With Mill objective immortality is indeed a
possibility, as it was not for Comte; but its
realisation is quite uncertain. Yet it is here
rather than in relation to personal theism that
his philosophical principles gave him tenable
grounds for an attitude not wholly suspensory.
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ASPECTS OF LATER THOUGHT
THE most genuinely philosophical advance made
since Comte and Mill has consisted in a
renewed effort to lay hold of the traditional
speculative problems they had in different degrees
set aside. While Mill was applying destructive
dialectic to the conglomerate constructions of
Hamilton and the attenuated Kantianism of
Mansel, Herbert Spencer, with even less direct
knowledge than Mill of German thought, was
working out, from the very imperfect version of
it before him, a metaphysical theory not wanting
in universality. Taking the Absolute of Hamilton
and Mansel seriously, and ignoring their Christian
theism, he put forth as the prelude to a system
of scientific philosophy the ontological doctrine
that that which lies behind the phenomena
accessible to science is a dernonstrably positive
but at the same time demonstrably unknowable
F 81real Being. The unknowable is the object of
what is permanent in the religious sentiment,
of which the essence is the consciousness of an
insoluble mystery. This was as far as Spencer
carried metaphysics; but later thinkers, not
acquiescing in his resignation of further search
into reality as distinguished from appearance,
have tried again, with or without aid from newer
scientific ideas, to grasp the whole. Some of
these attempts could easily be brought into
relation with the ideas of Comte and Mill last
discussed. An atheological doctrine of personal
immortality, for example, though it was not
Mill s actual belief, has some affinity with his
metaphysical conclusion regarding consciousness.
And for a doctrine of pampsychism Comte s
fictions might take the place of anticipatory
Platonic myths.
To discuss this aspect of their thought is,
however, to take both thinkers on their less
characteristic side. The strength of both
positively was in the ordering of scientific
knowledge from general points of view, and its
direction to rationalise the life of man. The
difference that goes with this resemblance may
perhaps best be put thus : that Cornte was not
more superior to Mill as a system-builder than
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Mill was to Comte as a critic, the word critic
being taken in the widest sense. The observation
of Professor Bain, though it may not have been
made with Comte in view as the antithesis to
Mill, seems here particularly apt. A multitude
of small impressions may have the accumulated
effect of a mighty whole. Thus in a summary
it is more difficult to do justice to Mill than to
Comte. The essays, for example, collected in the
four volumes of Dissertations and Discussions,
which cannot well be brought into a short general
view, would add more varied interest to the
outline than Comte s subsidiary expositions of
his system, such as the Cateckisme Positiviste or
the Appel aux Conservateurs, to which reference
has been similarly omitted.
But this is not all that there is to say. While ^
Comte was essentially a systematiser, his system
is at certain points demonstrably wrong, not
merely from the imperfect knowledge of the
time, but from the very nature of its exclusions.
His doctrine is not in conception at the level of
Platonisrn or Aristotelianism, failing as it does to
give any adequate consideration to dialectic
or first philosophy. Doubtless it will be found
to have less permanent aesthetic value. On the
other hand, if we refuse to be compelled to take.,
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it or leave it as a whole, it remains profoundly
suggestive both in relation to science and practice.
The stimulative power that might seem to belong
more naturally to the comparatively dispersive
thinking of Mill, with his cultivated openness of
mind, is now far more present in the rigorous
dogmatism of the Positive Philosophy and Polity.
Mill s miscellaneous work was for his own
generation, and contributes little, directly or
indirectly, to solve newer problems. To complete
the antithesis, Mill, though he has left no system
of philosophy, has done a single piece of work
that marks a definitive step forward in human
thought such as has not been taken by any of
the great systematisers who appeared in his
century. For Mill s Inductive Logic is unques
tionably a new organon, susceptible of common
use by other minds. This cannot be said of
Hegel s Logic. And Comte, to adopt the accurate
distinction of his disciple Mr. Frederic Harrison,
has indeed instituted/ but he has not con
stituted, Sociology. All that is definitive in his
treatment is the discovery of the historical
method, which merely contributes one chapter
to Mill s Logic.
That neither Mill nor Comte was affected by
the evolutionary biology which had been rising
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into notice in Germany even before it received
scientific proof from Darwin or speculative de
velopment from Spencer, does not seem impor
tant in relation to the special work of either.
So far as the idea of organic development had a
bearing on Comte s own work, he accepted it.
Social evolution is a phrase that he constantly
employs, perhaps before any one else. And the
rational problems that Mill attacked in his theory
of knowledge and in his ethics are not really
solved by bringing in the experience of the race
to supplement that of the individual. The full
acceptance of biological evolution by Spencer
before the appearance of the Origin of Species,
and his cosmical extension of the idea, did not
enable him to get rid of the individualism that
Comte had left behind from the beginning.
Thus his Sociology is in some respects belated
as compared with Comte s. His
c social organism
is thought of in biological terms, much like the
body politic of Hobbes. For, of course, the term
individualism is not used here in reference to
a theory of government. The point is that
Commonwealth, or the social organism, what
ever may be regarded as the ideal mode of its
regulation, is conceived only as composite Man,
and not also as in its social character a condition
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prior to the existence of its component units as
human individuals. Comte, we have seen, had
fully attained this latter conception. Here at
least no fault can be found with him from the
evolutionary side. No doubt it was inevitable
that evolution should at first seem to overshadow
everything else; but we can now see that to
social and political science the distinctively
evolutionary thinkers contributed less than either
Comte or Mill. It is not in relation to their
distinctive work, but where that reaches its limit,
that we shall find an advance due to evolution
ary thought.
The real scientific advance made by Spencer
on Comte is the result not of his evolutionism,
but of his studies in subjective psychology, and
his consequent recognition that this, and not
biology, immediately precedes the science of
society. Prior to sociology, it has been allowed,
the individual cannot be properly known; but
there is a preliminary science of the more
elementary laws of mind, worked out subjectively,
which does for the sociologist what Comte
erroneously attributed to cerebral physiology.
That in psychological introspection the observed
and the observer are identical is no doubt a
paradox from the point of view of the objective
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sciences; but introspection is not therefore illu
sory. Comte s own historical method is no less
real because it cannot be applied in biology.
The distinctiveness of his insight into the nature
of history is undeniable; but he partially failed
when he came to deal with the pre-history
that is the more special province of Spencer and
the anthropologists. And his failure here was
closely connected with his non-recognition of the
introspective method. What he missed was
precisely the animism which, according to
Tylor and Spencer, was started by primitive
man in order to explain the peculiarities of that
subjective consciousness which psychologists re
gard as the material of a positive science. In
Comte s view, as we have seen, all the theologies
can be explained by derivation from a primitive
theory that objects themselves are animated.
The gods of polytheism being the result of
generalisation from resemblances between objects
of the same class, a god who, since he is common
to all, can no longer be localised, comes to be
thought of as separable from any object whatso
ever. Now it cannot be absolutely denied that
the notion of a separable deity might arise in
this fashion. And, if it did, subsequent general
isation would no doubt suffice to explain mono-
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theism also. A more natural explanation of the
separability of the god seems, however, to be
furnished by primitive animism. The notion of
a separable soul is first evolved as an explanation
of the phenomena of life and mind in man himself,
and then (according to Dr. Tylor s form of the
ghost-theory ) a similar soul is imaginatively
projected into objects. The ghost-soul (accord
ing to both Tylor and Spencer) is at first con
ceived as a shadowy semblance of the bodily form,
and is supposed to go away and return because
this hypothesis seems required by the alternations
of personal consciousness and unconsciousness,
the imagery with which the separable entity is
clothed being supplied by reflexions, shadows,
and other accompaniments of the tangible person.
Thus what is primitive is animism/ or the
notion of a population of separable spirits. From
these, the separable deities are derivative, directly
or indirectly. Fetishism/ or the notion that
there is a soul in certain objects, is secondary;
and the idea of universally animated matter is
a generalisation out of man s reach at the earliest
stage. Now this ghost-theory/ since it has been
founded on careful collation of evidence about
the beliefs of savages at all stages, does not seem
likely to be displaced as a whole. Had Cerate sASPECTS OF LATER THOUGHT
insight not been defective in pure psychology,
it is probable that the hints of metaphysical
precursors like Hobbes would have suggested
it to him. As it is, no shade of a suggestion
of it, so far as I recollect, occurs in any of his
writings.
Yet it must be allowed that there is a tendency
of late to regard the strictest interpretation of
the ghost-theory as overstrained. The notion
that the world of objects is itself animated, some
modern theorists maintain, was directly suggested,
apart from all ideas of ghosts, by the phenomena
of moving things. To all things that are appar
ently active, life is directly ascribed by analogy
with active persons. The case is, perhaps, one
where combination of theories may be permis
sible. The ghost-theory undoubtedly, and per
haps even Comte s derivation of all later develop
ments from fetishism, might with ingenuity be
stretched to cover the facts; but we have no
sound reason for attempting to work exclusively
either with one or the other, if there is evidence,
as there may be, of independent origins. The
law called by Sir William Hamilton the law of
parsimony, as Mill pointed out, is not a law of
nature, but only a methodological rule. We must
not invent hypothetical causes where known
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causes suffice to explain the phenomena; and,
if we have to recur to hypotheses, we must not
multiply hypothetical causes without necessity;
but, when we know of more than one, or of many
experienced causal processes, we need not dismiss
a portion of them for the mere sake of simplifying
our explanations. The processes of nature are
frequently complex.
This was fully recognised by Comte, who was
himself strongly opposed to the chimerical uni
fications that are not content with carrying
scientific explanation into everything, but aim
at the reduction of all laws to one. The excess
of system here can be redressed by his own
principles. It is not the result of too great a
striving after speculative unity, but of a too
absorbing desire to unify human life. Neither
in Comte nor in Mill do we meet with the barren
formulae that seem to explain everything while
actually explaining nothing. Indeed, the demand
for precision and applicability becomes on one
side a defect, as limiting the speculative outlook.
Both are too exclusively humanist. Here is the
real failing in their philosophy that might have
been corrected by application of evolutionary
theories with their appeal to cosmic emotion.
In Mill, as in Comte, there is a theoretical oppo-
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sition of man to the cosmos which seems to make
of him a kind of miracle in nature. Evolution
in its larger aspects restores a wholeness that
both were sometimes too willing to renounce.SELECTED WORKS
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